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NEO-INCORPORATION: THE BURGER COURT AND
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
ROBERT L. CORD*
I. INTRODUCTIONO VER three decades have passed since Justice Black wrote that
"[tihe scope and operation of the Fourteenth Amendment have
been fruitful sources of controversy in our constitutional history.'
Today, the procedural guarantees of the fourteenth amendment2 are at
the center of that controversy. An analysis of the Burger Court's
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Northeastern University. B.B.A., City College of
New York, 1956; M.A., Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 1958; Ph.D. 1967. Liberal Arts
Fellow in Law and Political Science, Harvard Law School, 1970-1971.
1. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235 (1940). The fourteenth amendment has also been a
fruitful source of extra-judicial legal writing. See H. Black, A Constitutional Faith 23-42 (1969);
B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 76-90 (1921); Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 Harv. J. Legis. 1 (1968); Black, .The Bill of
Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 865 (1960); Brennan, Extension of the Bill of Rights to the States, 44
J. Urban L. 11 (1966); Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 761 (1961);
Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State
Authority, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1954); Fairman, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. Chli. L.
Rev. 144 (1954); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949); Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation"
of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 Harv. L.
Rev. 746 (1965); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L Rev.
929 (1965); Green, The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court, 46
Mich. L. Rev. 869 (1948); Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73
Yale L.J. 74 (1963); Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 Colum. L Rev. 181
(1969); Lacy, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Evolution of the
Absorption Doctrine, 23 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 37 (1966); Landynski, Due Process and the
Concept of Ordered Liberty: "A Screen of Words Expressing Will in the Service of Desire'?, 2
Hofstra L. Rev. 1 (1974); Mendelson, Mr. Justice Black's Fourteenth Amendment, 53 Minn. L.
Rev. 711 (1969); Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Judicial Interpretation, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 140 (1949); Mykkeltvedt, Justice Black and the Intentions
of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendments First Section: The Bill of Rights and the States,
20 Mercer L. Rev. 432 (1969); O'Brien, Juries and Incorporation in 1971, 1971 Wash. U.L.Q. 1;
Richter, One Hundred Years of Controversy: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights,
15 Loyola L. Rev. 281 (1968-1969). For a discussion of "substantive" due process, see note 109
infra.
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
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contributions to this long-standing dispute requires an exploration of
earlier approaches.
During the 1940s and 1950s two basic approaches to the relationship
between the Bill of Rights-particularly the procedural guarantees of
the fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments-and the fourteenth
amendment emerged. Justice Jackson gave a general outline of each
when he spoke for the Court in Fay v. New York: 3
The due process clause is one of comprehensive generality, and in reducing it to apply in
concrete cases there are different schools of thought. One is that its content on any subject
is to be determined by the content of certain relevant other Amendments in the Bill of
Rights which originally imposed restraints on only the Federal Government but which the
Fourteenth Amendment deflected against the states. The other theory is that the clause
has an independent content apart from, and in addition to, any and all other Amend-
ments. This meaning is derived from the history, evolution and present nature of our
institutions and is to be spelled out from time to time in specific cases by the judiciary. 4
An examination of these two viewpoints is important to an under-
standing of their development and modification.
The first school about which Justice Jackson spoke embraces a
philosophy which envisions the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment as incorporating specific guarantees detailed in the first
eight amendments, thus protecting them from state power. Justices
who subscribe to this theory hereafter will be referred to as "incor-
porationists." 5 The other school subscribes to an independent meaning
of due process, not specifically derived from any particular amend-
ments, which protects from state infringement all "fundamental rights"
essential to the "concept of ordered liberty."' 6 The Justices who sub-
scribe to this theory will be referred to as the "ordered liberty" school.
A general analysis of the ordered liberty approach to the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment is an appropriate point of de-
parture.
II. THE ORDERED LIBERTY APPROACH
The ordered liberty approach to the meaning and content of the
fourteenth amendment due process clause can be traced to within two
decades after the amendment's ratification in 1868. In Hurtado v.
California,7 Justice Matthews, delivering the opinion of the Court,
3. 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
4. Id. at 287-88.
5. "The architect of the contemporary 'incorporation' approach to the Fourteenth Amendment
is, of course, Mr. Justice Black." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 144 (1970) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Part III, infra, discusses the origin and development of the incorporation approach.
6. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969).
7. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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stated that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, like
that of the fifth amendment, required that governmental power be
"exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions ... ." This phrase grew in importance after the Supreme Court's
decision in Twining v. New Jersey.9 Justice Moody, speaking for the
Court, used the Hurtado language to define the protection of the
fourteenth amendment.10 Twining, however, did nof define those
principles which are fundamental to liberty and justice, nor did it
specify where they might be found.
The first major attempt by the Supreme Court to answer these
inquiries was undertaken by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connec-
ticut.11 He began by rejecting the total incorporationist approach
which holds that all of the immunities of the Bill of Rights are liberties
protected by the fourteenth amendment.' 2 To substantiate this re-
jection, Justice Cardozo listed several immunities protected by the Bill
of Rights that the Court explicitly had held not to be protected from
state intrusion by the fourteenth amendment.' 3 He then stated that
some of the protections of the Bill of Rights are guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. 14 The essence of the opinion was Justice
Cardozo's attempt to clarify the Court's method of determining which
immunities found in amendments one through eight are also protected
by the fourteenth amendment. In so doing he instituted the "ordered
liberty" approach to the meaning of the fourteenth amendment due
process clause. All the protections against government that are "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Justice Cardozo held, are
protected from invasion by state power.' s Under this approach the
8. Id. at 535. See generally Landynski, Due Process and the Concept of Ordered liberty. "A
Screen of Words Expressing Will in the Service of Desire"?, 2 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 10-13 (1974).
9. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). Twining held that the fourteenth amendment does not include the
protection against self-incrimination. Essentially, Twining has been overruled. Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964). See The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 223-24 (1964).
10. 211 U.S. at 106.
11. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Palko, which held that the fourteenth ,amendment does not include
the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy, was overruled in Benton v. Mfaryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
12. 302 U.S. at 323. The total incorporationist approach of Justice Black is discussed in Part
iM, infra.
13. 302 U.S. at 323-24. Hurtado was cited for the proposition that the fourteenth amendment
does not compel the states to indict solely by grand jury. Twining and subsequent similar cases
were listed to show that a state may compel a person to be a witness against himself in a criminal
case without violating the fourteenth amendment. Cases indicating that provisions of the fourth,
sixth and seventh amendments were inapplicable to the states also were catalogued. Id.




courts would have to identify those fundamental liberties through a
case-by-case analysis. 16
The Court's rationale in Palko illustrates the essentials of the or-
dered liberty approach. The due process clause has a comprehensive
meaning distinctively its own. The immunities considered fundamental
to liberty and justice are embodied in the meaning of "ordered liberty"
and "due process," both of which restrict state power through the
fourteenth amendment. Although all the specific guarantees of the Bill
of Rights have value and importance, only those provisions of the first
eight amendments which are fundamental rights-essential to a con-
cept of ordered liberty-are protected from the states by the fourteenth
amendment. 17 Finally, Justice Cardozo catalogued those rights which
the Court, at that time, held to be fundamental and thus protected by
the fourteenth amendment: freedom of thought, freedom of speech,
and the right to a fair trial.18
In Palko, Justice Cardozo's analysis of Powell v. Alabama19 illus-
trates the ordered liberty approach to the relationship between a
particular procedural right-which might also be specified in one of
the first eight amendments-and the fundamental right to a fair trial
inherent in the fourteenth amendment. Justice Cardozo noted that, in
Powell, the sixth amendment right to counsel, as such, was not made
applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Rather, the
right to counsel under the circumstances of Powell was constitutionally
required. "The decision turned upon the fact that in the particular
situation laid before [the Powell Court] in the evidence the benefit of
counsel was essential to the substance of a hearing. '20 This language
illustrates that the right to a fair trial was viewed as having a meaning
16. The rejection of the incorporationist approach necessitated the adoption of a more flexible
concept of due process. It is possible to trace Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko to an earlier
expression favoring flexible interpretation of the constitution. See B. Cardozo, The Nature of the
Judicial Process 76-90 (1921).
17. "If the Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed them, the process of absorption has had its
source in the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." 302 U.S. at
326. See generally Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 Yale L.J.
74, 78-81 (1963).
18. 302 U.S. at 326-27. The concept of a "fair trial" has been a major source of controversy in
the judicial history of the due process clause. See Green, The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 869, 876 (1948). Compare Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942) with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). On the other hand, the
Court generally has agreed that all first amendment protections, as well as those listed by
Cardozo, are applicable to the states. See Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the
Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 746,
747-49 (1965).
19. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
20. 302 U.S. at 327.
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independent of the specific procedural protections of any other
amendments. 21
By holding that "[d]ue process of law requires that the proceedings
shall be fair," and that fairness is a "relative, not an absolute con-
cept,"122 the justices adopting an ordered liberty approach to the due
process clause have resisted listing all of the procedural safeguards that
make for a fair trial; they maintain that in some circumstances a
procedure may be vital, and in others inconsequential. In 1942, for
instance, the Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel in
all serious criminal cases was not essential to due process; Justice
Roberts reiterated the fair trial-due process philosophy identified with
the ordered liberty school of thought:
As we have said, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incar-
ceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness
and right, and while want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking
in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the Amendment embodies an inexorable
command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice
accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel. 21
A significant characteristic of the ordered liberty school is its
dynamic concept of due process. Spokesmen for this approach, such as
Justice Frankfurter, have not provided an exhaustive definition of due
process. "Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not
confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be
deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights." 24 Justice
Frankfurter, the dean of the ordered liberty school until his retire-
ment in 1962, viewed due process as embodying the principles of
justice commonly held throughout western civilization in general and
by the English-speaking peoples in particular.25 Interpreting the due
21. Although the reasoning of the Palko decision seems clear, its language has been used for
other purposes. Justice Brennan, the architect of the "selective incorporation" approach to the
fourteenth amendment, based his theory on the "absorption" language used by Justice Cardozo in
Palko. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1960). Justice Brennan appears to have
equated "absorption" with "selective incorporation." The invalidity of this thesis was demon-
strated by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1964). See
Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 Yale L.J. 74, 80-81 (1963).
But see Landynski, Due Process and the Concept of Ordered Liberty. "A Screen of Words
Expressing Will in the Service of Desire"?, 2 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 31-39 (1974). See also notes 87 and
148 infra.
22. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934).
23. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942), overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
24. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
25. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The validity of this
1975]
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process clause and the fair trial concept as generative principles, the
ordered liberty school rejects a rigid incorporation concept that limits
these principles to the particulars of the first eight amendments.2 6
Justice Frankfurter nevertheless recognized that the lack of an au-
thoritative formulation of the content of the due process clause raised
serious problems. How are the states to determine what the fourteenth
amendment demands in terms of state criminal procedures? What role
does the ordered liberty approach to due process demand of the Supreme
Court and lower court judges in discovering the canons of decency and
fairness inherent in this historical concept? Does this approach to due
process allow judges unlimited discretion in the interpretation of
constitutional law by substitution of personal predilections for fixed legal
principles?
Justice Frankfurter often addressed himself to these questions; he
understood the Court's role to be that of carefully giving content to the
due process clause through a case-by-case analysis. 27 Viewing the
Court's role in a particular case narrowly, Justice Frankfurter and the
other ordered liberty justices consistently have urged that the Court
not engraft a rigid set of procedures onto the due process clause.
Judicial self-restraint, they argued, would preclude the Court from
using a specific case to address itself to a host of unlitigated issues not
properly before the Court.28 On the other hand, for Justice
Frankfurter, case-by-case analysis of due process did not mean that
constitutional law is to be declared on an ad hoc basis. Rather, there
are guiding principles, not procrustean rules, to delimit the interpre-
tations of the Court:
The vague contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave judges at large. We may
not draw on our merely personal and private notions and disregard the limits that bind
judges in their judicial function. Even though the concept of due process of law is not final
and fixed, these limits are derived from considerations that are fused in the whole nature
of our judicial process. 29
principle, and of the ordered liberty school as a whole, has been challenged. "Confine [the ordered
liberty approach], as Mr. Justice Frankfurter is now attempting, to 'the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples' (however odd these 'notions' may be), and it is still so broad as to be
meaningless .... " Green, The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme
Court, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 869, 899 (1948) (footnote omitted).
26. "[The] standards of justice [of English-speaking peoples] are not authoritatively formu-
lated anywhere as though they were prescriptions in a pharmacopoeia." Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
27. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
28. CL Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 696-97 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
29. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952) (footnote omitted).
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Justice Frankfurter recognized that a flexible and dynamic concept
of due process could be a source of judicial confusion and uncertainty.
He warned that judges may be tempted to rely upon their own ideas of
social or legal justice if they fail to realize that their proper judicial role
is to reflect, rather than to renovate the historical sense of justice as
seen in the light of contemporary needs. Essentially, ordered liberty
justices should be viewed as seekers and proclaimers of the law, and
not as creators of the law. 30
Justice Frankfurter was also concerned that the basic limitations on
federal judicial authority inherent in the division of power established
by a federal system must not be altered by the due process guarantee.
"Due process of law . .. is not to be turned into a destructive dogma
against the States in the administration of their systems of criminal
justice. ' 31 The ordered liberty justices have maintained that juris-
diction over criminal justice originally was left with the states by the
Constitution and was delimited only in general terms by the addition
of the fourteenth amendment. Primary responsibility in criminal af-
fairs, although circumscribed somewhat by the demands of due pro-
cess, remains with the states. 32 Incorporation by the fourteenth
amendment of the specific criminal procedures of amendments one
through eight could mean a serious limitation, if not an end to state
authority in these matters. Thus, incorporation is viewed by this
school of justices as harmful to the principles of federalism.
Another argument advanced against the incorporation approach to
the fourteenth amendment is that it would be a grand act of judicial
legislation contrary to the Constitution. As Justice Frankfurter noted,
[t]he notion that the Fourteenth Amendment was a covert way of imposing upon the
States all the rules which it seemed important to Eighteenth Century statesmen to write
into the Federal Amendments, was rejected by judges who were themselves witnesses of
the process by which the Fourteenth Amendment became part of the Constitution. 33
30. See id. at 170-72. It is interesting to contrast Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Rochin with
a more recent extra-judicial statement. "The words of the Constitution are so unrestricted by their
intrinsic meaning or by their history or by tradition or by prior decisions that they leave the
individual justice free, if indeed they do not compel him, to gather meaning not from reading the
Constitution but from reading life." J. Simon, In His Own Image: The Supreme Court in Richard
Nixon's America 6 (1973).
31. 342 U.S. at 168.
32. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 412-13 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
33. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63-64 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). One
witness to the birth of the fourteenth amendment felt otherwise. The first Justice Harlan,
characterized by Justice Frankfurter as an "eccentric exception," indicated that the fourteenth
amendment did incorporate the first eight amendments. Id. at 62.
1975]
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The short answer to the theory that the due process clause is legislative
shorthand for the Bill of Rights is that "it is a strange way of saying it."
34
To review, the ordered liberty approach to the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment reveals adherence to the following prin-
ciples: due process has its own meaning independent of other parts of
the Constitution; due process protects from state intrusion the fun-
damental rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty; '35 the
indefinable concept of due process necessitates a case-by-case analysis
which gives contemporary content to this constitutional guarantee; the
primary role of the courts is to articulate the blend of historical values
and current standards which satisfy the due process requirements; in
the process of performing this judicial function, judges must be
extremely careful lest they elevate their own predilections to con-
stitutional dogma; the justices should avoid altering the division of
judicial power created by the federal system; and the due process
clause should not be used to implement judicial usurpation of legisla-
tive functions. Thus, the ordered liberty justices are concerned with
both the constitutional guarantees of the individual as represented by
the standards of the due process clause and the restriction of judicial
authority in our constitutional system.
The ordered liberty justices initially subscribed to a small list of
procedural essentials common to all fair trials. Such rights as effective
notice of the charge, an adequate opportunity to defend, 36 an impartial
tribunal, 37 an impartial jury untainted by interest or dominated by
fear, 38 and a jury selected without racial discrimination39 were held to
be ingredients essential to a fair trial. Generally, however, the ordered
liberty justices saw the fair trial guarantee of Palko as mandating
different procedural safeguards in diverse circumstances. 40 In Betts v.
Brady4 ' the Court held that an indigent's right to counsel in a state
criminal case was guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment only if the
special circumstances of that case necessitated the appointment of
34. Id. at 63. Ordered liberty justices have rejected the argument that the framers of the
fourteenth amendment intended to overrule the holding of Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243 (1833). In that case Chief Justice Marshall held that the first eight amendments were
restraints solely on the exercise of federal governmental power.
35. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled in Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969).
36. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), noted in 34 Colum. L. Rev. 767 (1934).
37. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
38. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
39. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
40. See generally Green, The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme
Court, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 869 (1948).
41. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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counsel in order to ensure a fair trial. Except for the procedural
essentials common to all fair trials, 42 the special circumstances rule
was applied to all other specific procedural rights.
An erosion of the special circumstances rule can be seen in Justice
Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in Wolf v. Colorado.43 After
rejecting the incorporationist approach, Justice Frankfurter held:
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at
the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. Itis therefore implicit in "the
concept of ordered liberty" and as such enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause."
Justice Frankfurter's language indicates that the security of one's
privacy is a right not dependent upon the existence of special circum-
stances.
In Gideon v. Wainwright,45 Justice Harlan explicitly rejected the
special circumstances rule.
In noncapital cases, the "special circumstances" rule has continued to exist in form
while its substance has been substantially and steadily eroded.... The Court has
come to recognize, in other words, that the mere existence of a serious criminal charge
constituted in itself special circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial. In
truth the Betts v. Brady rule is no longer a reality.
The special circumstances rule has been formally abandoned in capital cases, and
the time has now come when it should be similarly abandoned in noncapital cases, at
least as to offenses which, as the one involved here, carry the possibility of a
substantial prison sentence. 46
Subsequent to Gideon, Justice Harlan wrote other opinions in which he
abandoned the special circumstances rule.47 This new ordered liberty
approach to due process was significantly different than the case-by-case
analysis used by the ordered liberty majority on the Supreme Court
during the 1940s and 1950s.4 8
42. See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
43. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled in Mlapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
44. Id. at 27-28.
45. 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 350-51.
47. See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (concurring opinion) (right
to a speedy trialincorporated into fourteenth amendment); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,408(1965)
(concurring opinion) (sixth amendment right of confrontation incorporated into fourteenth amend-
ment).
48. Perhaps this change reflected an attempt by the ordered libertyjustices to accommodate their
position with the incorporation approach adopted by a majority of the Court in the 1960s. However,
neither the erosion of the special circumstances rule nor the existence of the incorpo-
ration majority should be equated with the demise of the ordered liberty approach to the due
1975]
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Ill. THE INCORPORATION APPROACH
A. Justice Black and Total Incorporation
"I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth applica-
ble to the states,"' 49 wrote Justice Black in a 1942 dissenting opinion
that represented the first clear embrace of the "incorporation theory" by a
contemporary Supreme Court justice.50 Justice Black, as a total incor-
porationist, saw the first section of the fourteenth amendment as literally
embodying all of the wording and content of the specific guarantees of the
first eight amendments.5 1 Consequently, he maintained that section one
and especially the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
circumscribe state authority in precisely the same manner as the Bill of
Rights conditions federal actions.5 2
According to Justice Black, an examination of the debates leading to
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment in the Senate and House
showed that its sponsors had as their purpose "to make secure against
invasion by the states the fundamental liberties and safeguards set out
in the Bill of Rights. 53 Incorporation, far from being an act of judicial
expansion, was viewed by Justice Black as judicial obedience to the
clear historical command of the amendment's proponents in the
Congress.
The foundations of the incorporationist approach were not limited to
a technical analysis of the legislative history of the fourteenth
process clause. See the concurring opinions of Justices Harlan and Stewart in Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 117, 143 (1970).
49. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (footnote omitted) (Black, J., dissenting),
overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Justices Douglas and Murphy joined in
Justice Black's dissent.
50. The incorporation theory, however, did not originate with Justice Black. See Landynski,
Due Process and the Concept of Ordered Liberty: "A Screen of Words Expressing Will In the
Service of Desire"?, 2 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 38 n. 186 (1974).
Since Betts v. Brady was decided in 1942, Justice Black's opinions invariably have reflected his
incorporationist philosophy. E.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 108 n.2 (1970) (separate
opinion); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (concurring opinion); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (concurring opinion);
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion); see also H. Black, A
Constitutional Faith 23-42 (1969).
51. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
52. See id. at 89-90. An essential element of all traditional incorporation theories is that the
fourteenth amendment does not apply to the states merely a watered-down version of the Bill of
Rights. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964); see Part IV infra.
53. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474 n.1 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black later
undertook a detailed examination of the legislative history of the first section of the fourteenth
amendment. The results were appended to his dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 92-123 (1947). Justice Black's historical analysis of the fourteenth amendment precipi-
tated a wide-ranging debate in the legal periodicals. See note I supra and sources listed therein.
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amendment. Additionally, Justice Black was concerned that if the
ordered liberty concept should prevail, due process would remain a
vague phrase interpreted to embody the Court's own changing notions
of decency and justice.
I cannot consider the Bill of Rights to be an outworn 18th Century "strait jacket" as
the Twining opinion did. Its provisions may be thought outdated abstractions by some.
And it is true that they were designed to meet ancient evils. But they are the same kind
of human evils that have emerged from century to century wherever excessive power is
sought by the few at the expense of the many. In my judgment the people of no nation
can lose their liberty so long as a Bill of Rights like ours survives and its basic purposes
are conscientiously interpreted, enforced and respected so as to afford continuous
protection against old, as well as new, devices and practices which might thwart those
purposes. I fear to see the consequences of the Court's practice of substituting its own
concepts of decency and fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of Rights as
its point of departure in interpreting and enforcing that Bill of Rights. 4
Justice Black often attacked the ordered liberty concept of due
process as a "natural law" theory that expands the Supreme Court's
power unwisely, unconstitutionally and unnecessarily." For him, the
due process clause, if understood as a shorthand formula for the
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, would eliminate the case-by-
case review necessary under the ordered liberty approach. The con-
tinual necessity of review by the Supreme Court to determine the
nebulous content of the fourteenth amendment guarantees was
challenged by Justice Black as failing to provide adequate guidelines
for state legislatures and for state courts. In fact, Justice Black decried
as vague, inadequate and somewhat baffling the very process by which
the Supreme Court justices themselves were to determine the
commands of the due process clause.5 6
Justice Black also saw the ordered liberty doctrine as seriously
harming the federal division of power by subjecting the states to the
whim and caprice of the federal judiciary." He argued that, under the
ordered liberty approach, constitutional law was not fixed in the area
of procedural guarantees. Consequently, the state courts were not
provided with sufficiently precise federal opinions to allow them to
predict when a criminal proceeding should be reversed for want of a
"fair trial." More importantly, since the finding of a denial of fun-
damental fairness in a proceeding is based upon the particular facts in
that case alone, reversals do not necessarily set adequate general
standards for the states to follow.
Essentially Justice Black believed that only total incorporation was
54. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 75.
56. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
57. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 82-83 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
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consistent with "the great design of a written Constitution.,"5 8
Otherwise "the accordion-like qualities of [the ordered liberty]
philosophy [would] inevitably imperil all the individual liberty
safeguards specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights." 59 The
fourteenth amendment, Justice Black contended, did not protect any
fewer nor any more rights than those specified in amendments one
through eight. This close-ended concept of due process distinguished
Justice Black from all other incorporationists. 60 Justices who embraced
any open-ended concept of due process were categorized by Justice
Black as holding a natural law theory of due process. 61 Consequently,
Justice Black rejected not only an ordered liberty approach to due
process, but also all "emanation" or "penumbra" theories which hold
that fundamental rights other than those specifically enumerated in
the first eight amendments are also protected by the due process
guarantee. 62
B. Ultra-Incorporation
Since the incorporation theory was adopted by Justice Black in
1942, three justices63 have embraced a variation on the incorporation
theme which appropriately might be labeled ultra-incorporation. Un-
like the total incorporation position of Justice Black, the ultra-incor-
porationists accept as a minimum guarantee of due process the rights
protected by the first eight amendments. Looking beyond those par-
ticular guarantees, the ultra-incorporationists believe that the due
process protection may well embrace other fundamental rights not
specified in the Bill of Rights. These rights may "emanate" from other
rights specified in amendments one through eight or they may have an
independent existence. 64 Ultra-incorporation might be viewed as
58. Id. at 89.
59. 342 U.S. at 177.
60. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice
Black's dissent is crucial to an understanding of his incorporation position. In Griswold, he
rejected Justice Douglas' opinion of the Court and Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion because
they took the position that rights not specified in the Bill of Rights, such as "marital privacy," are
protected by the fourteenth amendment. No other incorporationist justices joined in Justice
Black's dissent. Justice Stewart, who did join in Justice Black's dissent, later rejected tile
incorporation theory in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 144-45 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring).
61. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-73 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
62. Compare Justice Black's dissenting opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
507 (1965) and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947).
63. Justices Murphy, Rutledge and Douglas.
64. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Douglas, J.) with Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 123 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 212
n.4 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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somewhat of an amalgam of the total incorporation position and an
open-ended approach to due process. As such it was viewed as an evil
by Justice Black, as was any theory with a flexible concept of due
process.
The earliest judicial embodiment of ultra-incorporation is contained
in Justice Murphy's dissent in Adamson v. California.65 Justice Mur-
phy previously had joined Justice Black's dissent in Betts v. Brady66
and had indicated subsequently that he subscribed to an incorporation
theory;6 7 but not until his statement in Adamson were his differences
with Justice Black apparent. There, he reaffirmed his agreement with
Justice Black's attempt to gain majority recognition for the incorpo-
ration doctrine, but he added a major qualification which clearly
distinguished his position:
While in substantial agreement with the views of Mr. Justice Black, I have one
reservation and one addition to make.
I agree that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be carried over intact
into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. But I am not prepared to say that
the latter is entirely and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights. Occasions may arise
where a proceeding falls so far short of conforming to fundamental standards of
procedure as to warrant constitutional condemnation in terms of a lack of due process
despite the absence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights. 68
The position of Justice Rutledge paralleled that of Justice Murphy. He
concurred in Justice Murphy's dissenting statement in Adamson,6 9 and
like Justice Murphy, did not join Justice Black's dissent. The inflexibil-
ity of the Black opinion seems to have been unacceptable to both of
them.
Had Justice Douglas passed from the judicial scene at the end of the
1940s, as did Justices Murphy and Rutledge, one would classify him as
a total incorporationist similar to Justice Black. Prior to the early
1960s, there was little reason to suspect that they might part company
philosophically over the scope of the due process clause. Like Justice
Murphy, Justice Douglas had concurred in the original Black in-
65. 332 U.S. 46, 123 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
66. 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
67. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605-07 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (fourteenth
amendment prohibition against self-incrimination identical to fifth amendment prohibition).
68. 332 U.S. at 123-24. It is interesting to note that Justice Murphy alludes only to procedural
rights which might be protected by the fourteenth amendment in addition to those specified in the
first eight amendments. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Justice Douglas claimed that
Justice Murphy espoused a version of substantive due process. Id. at 212 n.4 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). See note 81 infra. Ironically, Justice Douglas, himself, at one time attempted to use
Justice Murphy's dissent in Adamson as a basis for a substantive due process argument. See Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516 n.8, 521 n.13 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
69. 332 U.S. at 123.
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corporation opinion in Betts v. Brady.70 Unlike Justice Murphy,
however, Justice Douglas chose to join Justice Black's dissent in
Adamson.7 1 Apparently, at that time he had no reservations about the
Black opinion or saw no need to express them. What seems most
significant is that he chose not to join the Murphy-Rutledge opinion
which advocated a broader form of incorporation.
In 1961, evidence emerged that Justice Douglas had abandoned the
rigid total incorporation position held by Justice Black. Dissenting in
Poe v. Ullman,72 Justice Douglas stated that "[t]hough I believe that
'due process' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment includes all of the
first eight Amendments, I do not think it is restricted and confined to
them."' 73 Justice Douglas noted that the Court in previous cases had
used an "emanation" theory to expand protected "liberty" to include
such rights as the freedom to travel, the freedom of privacy and the
freedom to bring up one's children. 74 Although these liberties, as such,
are not mentioned in the Constitution, Justice Douglas maintained that
they derive from specific constitutional guarantees or from the con-
ditions essential for the perpetuation of a free society.75
There was no immediate reaction from Justice Black. His brief
dissent was confined to an expression of regret that the constitutional
issues were not "reached and decided."'76 The differences between
Justices Douglas and Black concerning the scope of the due process
protection became clearer, however, in Griswold v. Connecticut. 77 In
that case, Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, embraced an
"emanation" theory,78 whereas Justice Black dissented, sharply
denouncing the "emanation" theory and its flexible due process ap-
proach as a revived version of natural law.7 9
Taken together, Poe and Griswold indicate that in 1965 Justice
Douglas embraced an ultra-incorporationist position. In 1973, how-
ever, in Roe v. Wade, 8 0 Justice Douglas specifically denied subscribing
to the Murphy-Rutledge due process approach:
70. 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
71. 332 U.S. at 92.
72. 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961).
73. Id. at 516.
74. Id. at 516-17, 521. Justice Douglas quoted from Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
124 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting) to support his emanation statement. 367 U.S. at 521 n.13.
75. Id. at 516-17.
76. Id. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting).
77. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
78. Id. at 482-86.
79. Id. at 509-13, 518-20 (Black, J., dissenting).
80. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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There are, of course, those who have believed that the reach of due process in the
Fourteenth Amendment included all of the Bill of Rights but went further. Such was
the view of Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge .... Perhaps they were
right; but it is a bridge that neither I nor those who joined the Court's opinion in
Griswold crossed.81
The apparent distinction is that Justice Douglas' emanations and
penumbras are derived from specific rights found in the first eight
amendments, whereas the fundamental rights discussed by Justices
Murphy and Rutledge in Adamson may exist independently of the Bill
of Rights. 82
C. Selective Incorporation
The incorporation majority which emerged on the Supreme Court in
the early 1960s contained several justices who regarded the relation-
ship between the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment in a
way perhaps most suitably described as a fundamental rights approach
to selective incorporation.
Abstractly stated, this view of the fourteenth amendment rests on
two basic maxims. First, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment incorporates only those guarantees in the first eight
amendments that are fundamental to justice and a free society. Sec-
ond, the due process clause protects other fundamental rights which
may not be mentioned in the Bill of Rights. Implicit in the first
proposition has been the assumption that some of the guarantees of the
first eight amendments are not incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment.8 3 Implicit in the second proposition is the belief that due
process is not delimited by the Bill of Rights.8 4 Consequently, selective
81. Id. at 212 n.4 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas' rejection of the Murphy-
Rutledge approach appears to be based on the misconception that Justice Murphy's opinion in
Adamson was equivalent to a reintroduction of substantive due process. Id. Justice Douglas'
characterization of the Murphy-Rutledge approach seems unjustified. See note 68 supra.
82. The validity of this distinction is placed in doubt by Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961). See note 74 supra. On the other hand, in a concurring
opinion in Griswold, Justice Harlan also perceived a strict incorporationist approach by Justice
Douglas. "[The Court's opinion] seems to me to evince an approach to this case very much like
that taken by my Brothers Black and Stewart in dissent, namely: the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not touch this Connecticut statute unless the enactment is found to
violate some right assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights." 381 U.S. at 499
(Harlan, J., concurring); see Landynski, Due Process and the Concept of Ordered Liberty. "A
Screen of words Expressing Will in the Service of Desire"?, 2 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 41 (1974).
Ultimately, however, the distinction may be a semantic one, since an expansive reading of the
Bill of Rights automatically results in an expansive reading of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendmenL





incorporationists subscribe to a flexible due process theory which
resembles the ultra-incorporationist and the ordered liberty approaches
to due process. The basic distinction between a justice who subscribes
to an ultra-incorporation position and one who embraces the fun-
damental rights approach of selective incorporation seems to be that
the former begins with a total incorporation position and adds other
fundamental rights, while the latter selectively incorporates from
amendments one through eight only those rights deemed fundamental
and then adds other fundamental rights. Each theory is essentially
open-ended and, as such, is irreconcilable with the closed-ended due
process doctrine characteristic of total incorporation.
In the early 1960s, the spokesmen for selective incorporation were
Justices Brennan and Goldberg. 85 Justice Brennan subscribed to the
principles of incorporation as early as 1960. In a dissent in Ohio ex rel.
Eaton v. Price, 8 6 joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas
and Black, Justice Brennan rejected the ordered liberty doctrine,
stating that, although he neither "accepted nor rejected" the proposi-
tion that all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights are enforceable against
the States, it was clear that the process of "absorption" used by Justice
Cardozo in Palko was an early manifestation of selective incorpora-
tion. 87 Then, focusing on the major tenet of all traditional incorpora-
tion approaches to due process, Justice Brennan pointed out that once
the fourteenth amendment absorbs a Bill of Rights guarantee, it is
applied against the states with a force equal to that exerted upon the
federal government.88
Justice Brennan elaborated his Eaton position the following term. In
Cohen v. Hurley, 89 he wrote a lengthy dissent which set forth his view
of the judicial history of selective incorporation. Repudiating once
again the ordered liberty approach to due process, Justice Brennan
repeated that a right "absorbed" from the Bill of Rights into the
fourteenth amendment does not have diminished efficacy. Further, he
charged that those justices who believed that due process has an
"independent potency" not reliant upon the Bill of Rights were simply
85. Although Chief Justice Warren did not delineate the tenets of selective incorporation In
any of his written opinions, he joined in the important Brennan opinions which did. E.g., Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
86. 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
87. Id. at 274-75. Justice Brennan's absorption argument is similar to a theory developed by
Justice Black in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 85-86, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
Classification of Justice Cardozo as the first selective incorporationist would appear to be
inaccurate. See note 21 supra and note 148 infra.
88. See 364 U.S. at 274-75; see also Part IV infra.
89. 366 U.S. 117, 154 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting), overruled in Spevack v. Klein, 385
U.S. 511 (1967). Chief Justice Warren joined in Justice Brennan's dissent.
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refusing to accept the reality of incorporation-a process the Court
had, in fact, been employing selectively for many decades. 90 This
interpretation of Palko became the view of the Court's majority when
Justice Goldberg, in 1964, joined Justices Black and Douglas, and
Chief Justice Warren to support Justice Brennan's opinion in Malloy v.
Hogan. 91
In Pointer v. Texas, 92 his earliest statement on incorporation, Justice
Goldberg subscribed to Justice Brennan's analysis of judicial history.
"I adhere to and support the process of absorption by means of which
the Court holds that certain fundamental guarantees of the Bill of
Rights are made obligatory on the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. '93 By holding that only certain guarantees of the Bill of
Rights are obligatory against the states, Justice Goldberg's opinion in
Pointer had the ring of selective incorporation. In Griswold v. Con-
necticut94 Justice Goldberg noted, "I do not take the position of my
Brother Black in his dissent in Adainson . . . that the entire Bill of
Rights is incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ."s Justice
Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold is typical of the selective
incorporation approach. Not only did he discard any notion of total
incorporation, but, with Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan
joining him, he also endorsed the incorporation of only fundamental
rights. Further, he argued in favor of an open-ended due process
concept. First, Justice Goldberg indicated that although he had "not
accepted the view that 'due process' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates all of the first eight Amendments," he did
agree that "the concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are
fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of
Rights." 96 Then, citing James Madison and Justice Story to buttress his
flexible due process stance against Justice Black's dissent,9 7 Justice
Goldberg argued that the ninth amendment" was written in response
to fears that the explicit protection of certain rights in the Constitution
could be interpreted as negating the existence of rights not specified.
90. Id. at 156-57.
91. 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964).
92. 380 U.S. 400, 410 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). In Pointer, the sixth amendment
right of confrontation was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. Justice Goldberg also
joined in the opinion of the Court.
93. Id. at 414.
94. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
95. Id. at 492 (Goldberg, 3., concurring).
96. Id. at 486.
97. Id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting).
98. U.S. Const. amend. X "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
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Thus, Justice Goldberg reasoned, the very presence of the ninth
amendment bears witness that its framers recognized the existence of
fundamental rights other than those specified in the first eight
amendments. 99
It can be concluded that the judicial development of the fourteenth
amendment has placed primary emphasis on the flexibility of the due
process clause. The ordered liberty justices, the ultra-incorporationists
and the selective incorporationists all have agreed that the due process
clause is not a mere shorthand version of the Bill of Rights. Only
Justice Black equated the two constitutional concepts. His consistent
adherence to the total incorporationist approach placed him in the
anomalous position of advocating an expansive reading of the due
process clause during the 1940s and 1950s and a restrictive reading of
the due process clause during the 1960s. Throughout, however, his
preeminent concern was the preservation of the virtues of a written
constitution. 100 Justice Black believed that the strictures of a written
constitution would restrain the members of the Court from introducing
their own notions of constitutional right and wrong into the vague
contours of the due process clause. 10' As noted by Justice Harlan,
however, it would appear that Justice Black's formula for implement-
ing judicial self-restraint was unrealistic.
While I could not more heartily agree that judicial "self restraint" is an indispensa-
ble ingredient of sound constitutional adjudication, I do submit that the formula
suggested for achieving it is more hollow than real. "Specific" provisions of the
Constitution, no less than "due process," lend themselves as readily to "personal"
interpretations by judges whose constitutional outlook is simply to keep the Constitu-
tion in supposed "tune with the times" .... 102
IV. THE GENESIS OF NEO-INCORPORATION
Although mentioned above, 10 3 a crucial axiom of the ordered liberty
approach to due process represented by Justice Harlan must be
explored further. If a particular procedural right-which also happens
to be protected by the Bill of Rights-is held to be "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,' 0 4 federal guidelines defining that right in
99. 381 U.S. at 488-90.
100. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
101. See text accompanying note 54 supra. On the other hand, "[a] dislike for natural law
jurisprudence does not incorporate the Bill of Rights against the States." Richter, One Hundred
Years of Controversy: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 15 Loyola L. Rev.
281, 294 (1968-69).
102. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
103. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
104. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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a federal criminal proceeding do not automatically apply to the states.
Justice Harlan made this point carefully in Gideon v. Wainwright:'° s
When we hold a right or immunity, valid against the Federal Government, to be
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and thus valid against the States, I do not
read our past decisions to suggest that by so holding, we automatically carry over an
entire body of federal law and apply it in full sweep to the States.' 0 6
Under an ordered liberty approach, the states should be free to develop
their own criminal procedures--or to adopt the federal rules if they
choose-so as to guarantee the procedural rights held implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. For example, under Justice Harlan's ap-
proach the exact nature of the right to counsel can vary from state to
state under the fourteenth amendment as long as the right is
sufficiently implemented to be effective.
Precisely the opposite principle is reflected in all the traditional
incorporation approaches to the fourteenth amendment. Justice
Brennan's majority opinion in Malloy v. Hogan, 10 7 incorporating the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, stated this in-
corporation principle succinctly: "The Court . . . has rejected the
notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a
'watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the
Bill of Rights' . ,,.O The traditional incorporationist justices believe
that when a right, whether procedural or substantive, 0 9 is incorporated
105. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
106. Id. at 352 (Harlan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
107. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
108. Id. at 10-11. Justice Brennan is quoting his own dissent in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price,
364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960).
109. It has been suggested that only incorporated substantive rights be applied against the
states with equal force as against the federal government. See Henkin, "Selective Incorporation"
in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 Yale L.J. 74, 84-88 (1963). The judicial development of the
due process schools focused upon procedural due process in state criminal proceedings. Con-
sequently, this Article emphasizes this area of the debate since it tends most clearly to illuminate
the philosophical differences among the various schools. It should be noted, however, that
recently the due process clause has provided a basis for significant changes in the area of
"substantive" due process and procedural due process in civil proceedings.
Substantive due process at one time referred to constitutional restraints placed upon state
regulation of private property. It is generally agreed that this economic substantive due process is
no longer viable. "[iTith the New Deal the very words became unmentionable for the Court."
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1410, 1417 (1974). It has been suggested that
economic substantive due process may be enjoying a rebirth under the guise of the application of
the federal antitrust laws to state regulatory schemes. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and
Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 328, 329-40 (1975).
More recently, the "liberty" of Adam Smith has been supplanted by that of John Stuart Mill.
See Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1410, 1417 (1974). The focus of this new
substantive due process has been the protection of political and civil liberties. See Henkin,
"Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 Yale L.J. 74, 85 (1963). In the early
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from the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, it limits state
power with exactly the same force as the particular amendment condi-
tions federal power. 110 The erosion of this basic maxim of the traditional
incorporation approach characterizes the development of "neo-
incorporation."
When Justice Stewart joined the Court in 1958,111 the ordered
liberty majority was still intact."i 2 Only Justices Black and Douglas
were firmly convinced of the correctness of the incorporation approach
to due process. Initially, Justice Stewart identified with the ordered
1960s the new substantive due process was thought to include the substantive rights protected by
the first and fourth amendments. Id. at 85-88. Both due process schools generally agreed, in fact
if not in theory, that the substantive rights of the first and fourth amendments extended to the
states by virtue of the fourteenth. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684
(1959) (first amendment applicable to the states); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (right of
privacy, at core of fourth amendment, applicable to the states but exclusionary rule not applicable
to the states), overruled in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Frankfurter, Memorandum on
"Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 746, 747-49 (1965). But see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505-06 (1957)
(Harlan, J., separate opinion).
Most recently, substantive due process has been associated with the emerging right of privacy.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v,
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Epstein, Substantive
Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. Ct. Rev. 159; Henkin, Privacy
and Autonomy, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1410 (1974); Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations,
Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 235 (1965);
Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1973).
Additionally, procedural due process in civil actions has gained in importance in recent years.
See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v.
Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). These cases
have so expanded the right to procedural due process that "it has been suggested that due process
serves as a general prohibition of government arbitrariness . . . ." The Supreme Court, 1973
Term, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 84-85 (1974). The Burger Court has limited the expansion of
procedural due process in this area. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
110. For this reason, federal case law relating to a particular amendment may be used when
applying the amendment to the states.
111. Justice Stewart replaced Justice Burton, an ordered liberty justice. See, e.g., Bute v.
Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 648 (1948).
112. The adherence to ordered liberty-fair trial principles by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan
was clear. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan had not yet endorsed selective incorpora-
tion; both had joined in or written opinions which employed the fair trial terminology associated
with ordered liberty. Justice Brennan used the fair trial approach in Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S.
155 (1957). He also joined in Justice Burton's opinion in Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426
(1958) and Justice Clark's opinion in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), both of which
followed the fair trial approach. In his dissents in Breithaupt, supra at 440, and Hong v. New
Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 473 (1958) and in his majority opinion in Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199 (1960), Chief Justice Warren also used the fair trial approach.
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liberty group. In 1959, he joined in the extensively documented
Frankfurter denunciation of incorporation in Bartkis v. Illinois.113
Two years later, Justice Stewart's vote was decisive in Cohen v.
Hurley 1 4 which sustained the Twining and Adamson precedents
against an enlarged incorporationist minority of Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan. Shortly thereafter, justice
Stewart began shifting his approach to due process.
The earliest manifestation of Justice Stewart's due process transition
is his memorandum opinion in Mapp v. Ohio. 115 There, he concurred
with Justice Harlan's dissent only insofar as it criticized the majority's
view that the controlling constitutional issue of the case was the
admissibility of evidence seized Without a search warrant. Justice
Stewart did not join in the rest of Justice Harlan's opinion which
reiterated the concept of privacy implicit in ordered liberty."16
Eventually, Justice Stewart dealt with the constitutional issue de-
cided by the majority in Mapp. In Lanza v. New York, "17 Justice
Stewart's opinion for the Court acknowledged that the fourth
amendment had been incorporated into the fourteenth. Mapp was cited
with apparent approval." 8 Justice Stewart considered it "settled" that
the fourteenth amendment is a guarantee against the unreasonable
conduct of state officials "like" that of the fourth amendment against
federal officers. 119
Three weeks after Lanza, in Robinson v. California,120 Justice
Stewart held that a state statute which punished drug addiction with
imprisonment prescribed a cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the fourteenth amendment. The language employed by Justice
Stewart implied that there is no distinction between the eighth and
fourteenth amendment guarantees.12 1
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that Justice Stewart had
moved toward some kind of incorporation position is found in his
113. 359 U.S. 121 (1959). Justice Frankfurter stated. "We have held from the beginning and
uniformly that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the States
any of the provisions of the first eight amendments as such." Id. at 124.
114. 366 U.S. 117 (1961), overruled in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
115. 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961).
116. Id. at 678-86.
117. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
118. Id. at 142.
119. Id. Justice Harlan, concurring, conditioned his agreement on the understanding that he
did not see Justice Stewart's opinion as incorporating the fourth amendment. Id. at 147.
120. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
121. Id. at 666. That Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan joined
in Justice Stewart's opinion lends support to the inference that Justice Stewart was realigning
himself with the incorporationists.
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opinions for the Court in Stoner v. California'22 and Stanford v.
Texas.123 In both decisions, Justice Stewart used federal cases to
determine the scope of the fourteenth amendment guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 124 By so doing, he assumed that
the fourteenth amendment protection was identical with that of the
fourth amendment and that federal cases establishing the meaning of
the latter could also be used to determine the meaning of the former.
Scrutinized carefully, however, there is a significant distinction
between Justice Stewart's understanding of incorporation and that of
the other incorporationists on the Warren Court or even of an ordered
liberty proponent like Justice Harlan. This distinction is highlighted by
their respective opinions in Griffin v. California125 in which Justice
Douglas, joined by Justices Black, Brennan, Goldberg and Clark, held
that the "no-comment" rule12 6 was part of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination incorporated into the fourteenth.
As such, the rule prohibited comment in state courts upon the refusal
of a defendant to take the stand in his own defense. 12 7
Understanding incorporation to fully apply the federal standards to
state proceedings, Justice Harlan concurred in the decision. Accepting
incorporation of the fourth and fifth amendments as settled doctrine,
Justice Harlan concurred in Griffin, as he had in Aguilar v. Texas, 128
lest he contribute to weakening the procedural safeguards binding on
the federal government. After incorporation, Justice Harlan saw no
distinction between the guarantees of the fourth and fifth amendments
and those of the fourteenth.
I agree with the Court that within the federal judicial system the Fifth Amendment
bars adverse comment by federal prosecutors and judges on a defendant's failure to
take the stand in a criminal trial, a right accorded him by that amendment. And given
122. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
123. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
124. 376 U.S. at 488; 379 U.S. at 481. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
125. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
126. The "no-comment" rule is operative in the federal courts and generally precludes the
prosecutor or the judge from commenting to the jury on the failure of a defendant to take the
stand in a proceeding against him.
127. "We said in Malloy v. Hogan ... that 'the same standards must determine whether an
accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified.' We take that in its literal
sense and hold that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government,
and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment
by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence Is
evidence of guilt." 380 U.S. at 615 (footnote omitted).
128. 378 U.S. 108, 116 (1964). In Aguilar, Justice Goldberg, citing federal cases, reversed a
state narcotics conviction because the evidence of heroin possession was obtained pursuant to a




last Terms decision in Malloy v. Hogat. .. that the Fifth Amendment applies to the
States in all its refinements, I see no legitimate escape from today's decision and
therefore concur in it. I do so, however, with great reluctance, since for me the
decision exemplifies the creeping paralysis with which this Court's recent adoption of
the "incorporation" doctrine is infecting the operation of the federal system.' 2 9
But Justice Stewart was not so constrained. In his Griffin dissent, he
argued that the "no-comment" rule, which grew out of an act of
Congress, 130 was not part of the fifth amendment. Instead, Justice
Stewart maintained that within the broadly construed confines of the
fifth amendment, the states should be free to promulgate their own
procedural rules in this area.' 3 ' Justice Stewart's opinion in Griffin
accepted the language of incorporation but rejected its essence. He
indicated that incorporation of a federal procedural right does not
necessarily preempt the states' supervisory procedural powers.132 The
necessity of this preemption was previously regarded as one of the
fundamental distinctions between the incorporation and ordered lib-
erty approaches to due process. 133 In seeking to apply to the states only
the general principles of the fifth amendment guarantee against self-
incrimination, Justice Stewart in effect abandoned the traditional
understanding of incorporation, 34 in favor of a new concept---"neo-
incorporation. "135
Neo-incorporation appears to embrace the terminology of the
traditional incorporation approach but not its substance. According to
the neo-incorporation approach, a procedural right, which is admittedly
incorporated from the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment,
129. 380 U.S. at 615-16.
130. Id. at 620 n.4.
131. Id. at 623.
132. Id.
133. See text accompanying notes 103-10 supra.
134. Subsequent to his opinions in Griffin, Justice Stewart has continued to exhibit a less than
straightforward approach to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. He joined
Justice Harlan's dissents attacking incorporation in Benton v. M1aryland, 395 U.S. 784, 801 (1969)
and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968). In 1970, Justice Stewart himself denounced
the incorporation theory in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 143 (1970) (concurring opinion). In
1972, however, concurring with the incorporationists, Justice Stewart wrote dissents to Johnson
v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 397 (1972) and Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 414 (1972). There,
he argued that the sixth amendment right to a jury trial was incorporated by Duncan and that
this right includes the unanimity rule.
135. Another commentator, recognizing the same dichotomy which gave rise to the concept of
neo-incorporation, offers an alternative explanation. Rights which are deemed fundamental
should be totally incorporated; therefore, federal standards will apply to the states. If, however, a
right is not fundamental, the federal standards need not be applied to the states unless "under the
peculiar circumstances of the case the facts show that an accused person has been denied essential




may have a different effect on procedures in state criminal cases than
the original right has on procedures in federal criminal prosecutions.
An example of neo-incorporation is Justice Fortas' concurring opin-
ion in Duncan v. Louisiana.136 After joining the Court's opinion
incorporating the sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by jury in all
non-petty criminal prosecutions, Justice Fortas in his own opinion
disagreed with the interpretation that the fourteenth amendment
required following "not only the Sixth Amendment but all of its bag
and baggage, however securely or insecurely affixed they may be by
law and precedent to federal proceedings. ' 137 Arguing that the states
should have leeway to develop their own concept of trial by jury,
Justice Fortas saw no reason whatever to assume that the incorpora-
tion of this sixth amendment right required imposition on the states of
ancillary federal rules or "federal requirements such as unanimous
verdicts or a jury of 12 .... M38
Justice White, like Justice Stewart, -a holdover from the Warren
Court, has also followed a neo-incorporationist fourteenth amendment
approach. Justice White's concurrence with the majority in Aguilar v.
Texas 139 and in Pointer v. Texas 140 indicates'his basic incorporationist
tendencies, as does his opinion for the Court in Duncan v. Louisi-
ana. 141
Even though he has supported the general principle of extending
many of the specific Bill of Rights guarantees to the states, Justice
White frequently differed with the Warren Court's traditional incor-
porationists 142 as to the scope of those guarantees and the limitations
which they place on state authority. Justice White's dissenting opinions
in Robinson v. California, 14 3 Malloy v. Hogan, 144 and Escobedo v.
Illinois145 reflect these differences.
Justice White's agreement with Justice Stewart's dissent in Griffin v.
California146 and his subsequent opinions and voting record on the
136. 391 U.S. 145, 211 (1968).
137. Id. at 213; see Comment, Due Process and jury Trials in State Courts, 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 492,
504 (1968).
138. 391 U.S. at 213.
139. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
140. 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (incorporating the sixth amendment right of confrontation).
141. 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating the sixth amendment right to trial by jury in all non-
petty criminal cases). Justice White rejected the ordered liberty approach to the due process clause.
Id. at 149 n.14.
142. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and Goldberg,
143. 370 U.S. 660, 685 (1962).
144. 378 U.S. 1, 33 (1964).
145. 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964).
146. 380 U.S. 609, 617 (1965). Justice Stewart's dissent in Griffin is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 130-35 supra.
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Burger Court attest to his continued fidelity to a narrow construction
of incorporated procedural fights and his belief in the primacy of state
autonomy over criminal procedures, both of which characterize neo-
incorporation.
V. THE RISE OF NEO-INCORPORATION: THE BURGER COURT
Of the judges on the Burger Court, the due process approaches of
Justice Marshall and the four Nixon appointees remain to be consid-
ered.
Justice Marshall is an incorporationist-most likely a selective
incorporationist. His opinion for the Court in Benton v. Maryland147
rejected the philosophy of and overruled the holding of Palko. 1 48 Justice
Marshall noted that the Court has " 'increasingly looked to the specific
guarantees of the [Bill of Rights] to determine whether a state criminal
trial was conducted with due process of law.' 1149
Justice Marshall also is a traditional incorporationist, as distinct
from a neo-incorporationist, because of his view that "[o]nce it is
decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 'fundamental to
the American scheme of justice' . . . the same constitutional standards
apply against both the State and Federal Governments."'15 O
At first glance it appears that the four Nixon appointees 5I have also
embraced some kind of incorporationist approach and several of the
Burger Court's decisions support this conclusion.
In Procunier v. Martinez, 152 the opinion of the Court delivered by
Justice Powell evidenced little distinction between the relationship of
the first and fourteenth amendments. With Justice Rehnquist writing
the opinion of the Court in Michigan v. Tucker, 1'3 the majority-
147. 395 U.S. 784 (1969), noted in 23 Vand. L. Rev. 835 (1970).
148. 395 U.S. at 794. At one time it was claimed that the doctrine of selective incorporation
was derived from Palko. See note 21 supra. This theory has been criticized. Henkin, "Selective
Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 Yale L.J. 74, 80-81 (1963). Professor Henkin
correctly predicted that once the Court incorporated the double jeopardy provision "the doctrine
of selective incorporation would require the Court to apply the double jeopardy provision whole,
and to overrule Palko!" Id. at 81.
149. 395 U.S. at 794, quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967); see Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 267 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 238 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 116 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting
in part); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
150. 395 U.S. at 795.
151. Chief Justice Burger, appointed June 23, 1969, replaced Chief Justice Warren. Justice
Blackmun, appointed May 14, 1970, replaced Justice Fortas. Justice Powell, appointed December
9, 1971, replaced Justice Black. Justice Rehnquist, appointed December 15, 1971, replaced
Justice Harlan.
152. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
153. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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which included the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and
Powell-cited with apparent approval Malloy's incorporation of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination 15 4 and Griffin's
interpretation of the privilege to include the "no-comment" rule.'"5
Similarly, in Davis v. Alaska,156 Chief Justice Burger-joined by
Justices Blackmun and Powell, as well as Justices Douglas, Brennan,
Stewart and Marshall-reversed the petitioner's conviction based on
the failure of the trial court to apply fully the right of confrontation
incorporated by Pointer v. Texas and Douglas v. Alabama. 157 Addi-
tionally, the dissent by Justice White, in which Justice Rehnquist joined,
did not challenge Chief Justice Burger's premise that the sixth amend-
ment right of confrontation has been incorporated within the due process
clause. 158 In Cady v. Dombrowski, 159 the Court's opinion by Justice
Rehnquist and the dissent by Justice Brennan 160 assumed that the fourth
amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable to
the states. 161
Though the foregoing cases establish the incorporationist tendencies
of the Nixon appointees, the evidence is ample that, regarding several
important Bill of Rights procedural guarantees, they are not tradi-
tional incorporationists. Together with the votes of Justices White or
Stewart or both, a neo-incorporationist majority in procedural rights
now dominates the Burger Court.
A. Neo-Incorporation and the Right to Jury Trial
In 1968, Justice White, speaking for the Court in Duncan v.
Louisiana, 162 held "that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right
of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a federal
court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.' 1 63 It
appeared that this federal right with all its particulars had been made
applicable to state courts. However, the neo-incorporationist tendencies
of the Burger Court majority, which includes Justice White, have led to a
significantly different result.
154. Id. at 440.
155. Id. at 441 n.14.
156. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
157. Id. at 315.
158. Id. at 321.
159. 413 U.S. 433 (1973), noted in 35 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 712 (1974).
160. 413 U.S. at 450. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Douglas, Marshall and Stewart.
161. More recent cases also indicate that the present members of the Court subscribe to some
kind of incorporation position. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 419 U.S. 894 (1975); Daniel v. Louisiana,
420 U.S. 31 (1975). Butsee Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,538 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
162. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
163. Id. at 149.
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In Williams v. Florida, 1 64 Justice White, again speaking for the
Court, held that "the 12-man panel is not a necessary ingredient of
'trial by jury' . .16s Justices Douglas and Black agreed to this
holding which allowed for a de facto double standard for jury
membership in federal and state trials. 166 Only Justice Marshall
dissented based on his belief that the sixth amendment does require a
twelve person jury. 167 Thus, for Justice Marshall the fourteenth
amendment also requires a panel of twelve in state criminal cases.
Johnson v. Louisiana16 and Apodaca v. Oregon169 are true Burger
Court decisions, Justices Powell and Rehnquist having succeeded
Justices Black and Harlan. In both cases a neo-incorporationist ap-
proach replaced traditional incorporation principles. In Johnson, Jus-
tice White, speaking for a majority which included all the Nixon
appointees, addressed the issue of whether the fourteenth amendment's
incorporated right to trial by jury required a unanimous verdict. 170
Noting that the Court had "never held jury unanimity to be a requisite
of due process of law,"'171 Justice White upheld the state trial court's
nine to three verdict of guilty. 172
Although there was no opinion of the Court in Apodaca v. Ore-
gon,173 Justice White, in announcing the judgment of the Court, 174
spoke again to the key constitutional issue dividing the justices.
In Williams v. Florida ... we had occasion to consider a related issue: whether the
Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury requires that all juries consist of 12 men.
164. 399 U.S. 78 (1970); see Note, The Preclusion Sanction-A Violation of the Constitutional
Right to Present a Defense, 81 Yale L.J. 1342 (1972).
165. 399 U.S. at 86. To be accurate the Williams decision was not truly a Burger Court
product Of the two Nixon appointees then on the Court, only Chief Justice Burger participated
in the case although Justice Blackmun had taken his seat on the Court some thirteen days before
the decision was announced.
166. Id. at 107. Justices Douglas and Black attempted to maintain a traditional incor-
porationist view while upholding the constitutionality of a less than twelve person state criminal
jury. For these two justices, the fourteenth amendment was not seen as a vehicle carrying
different procedures to the states. Rather, they construed the sixth amendment as not requiring a
twelve person jury in federal cases; therefore, the fourteenth amendment does not place such a
requirement on the states. Id.
167. Id. at 116-17. Justice Marshall quoted Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), in which
the Court stated that the sixth amendment guarantees a jury "of twelve persons, neither more nor
less." Id. at 349.
168. 406 U.S. 356 (1972), noted in 61 Geo. L.J. 223 (1972).
169. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
170. 406 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1972).
171. Id. at 359.
172. Id. at 365.
173. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
174. Justice White's opinion was joined in by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun
and RehnquisL
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After considering the history of the 12-man requirement and the functions it performs
in contemporary society, we concluded that it was not of constitutional stature. We
reach the same conclusion today with regard to the requirement of unanimity. 7 5
In both Johnson and Apodaca, the three traditional incor-
porationists-Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall-dissented. 176
Their objections were expressed in Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion
which denounced the neo-incorporationist principles at work. 177 Seeing
the unanimity rule as part of the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury,
Justice Douglas argued that "[t]he result of today's decisions is anoma-
lous: though unanimous jury decisions are not required in state trials, they
are constitutionally required in federal prosecutions. How can that be
possible when both decisions stem from the Sixth Amendment?"' 78
Reviewing several of the previous cases which incorporated Bill of
Rights guarantees, Justice Douglas emphasized the frequently repeated
Malloy phrase-that the fourteenth amendment does not impose upon
the states a "watered down" version of the Bill of Rights. Justice Douglas
concluded by stating, "I would construe the Sixth Amendment, when
applicable to the States, precisely as I would when applied to the Federal
Government. ' 179 Lack of common subscription to this principle sepa-
rates the traditional and neo-incorporationists in other procedural rights
cases as well.
B. Neo-Incorporation and the Protection
Against Double Jeopardy
In 1972 the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, dismissed the
writ of certiorari which it earlier had granted in Duncan v. Tennes-
see. 180 That case raised the issue whether the fifth amendment double
jeopardy restriction, incorporated into the fourteenth amendment in
Benton v. Maryland, 18 1 prohibited a second trial for armed robbery
where the second indictment was identical in all respects to the first
except in the description of the weapon.182
175. 406 U.S. at 406.
176. Justice Stewart, having denounced the incorporation approach to the fourteenth
amendment in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 143 (1970) (concurring opinion), wrote a
dissenting opinion in both these cases stating, as did the three traditional incorporationists, that
Duncan incorporated the sixth amendment right to a jury trial and that this right includes the
unanimity rule. 406 U.S. at 414. See also note 134 supra.
177. 406 U.S. at 380.
178. Id. at 383.
179. Id. at 388.
180. 405 U.S. 127 (1972) (per curiam).
181. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
182. The first trial, based on an erroneous indictment charging a pistol was used, ended in a
directed jury verdict for acquittal. The second indictment, which charged that a 22 caliber rifle
was used, led to the conviction which was appealed. 405 U.S. at 128-29.
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While the neo-incorporationist majority held that the case did not
present a clear double jeopardy issue because those questions were
closely interrelated with Tennessee's rules of criminal pleading, 18 3 the
Court's three traditional incorporationists dissented, arguing that fed-
eral fifth amendment standards were clear and should be applied. 184
Justice Brennan, citing Green v. United States,18S stated that "a
defendant is placed in jeopardy once he is put to trial before a jury so
that if the jury is discharged without his consent he cannot be tried
again."1 8 6 Further Justice Brennan stressed the Court's holding in
Kepner v. United States:18 7 "It has long been the rule of this Court
that 'former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict
duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the verdict, and it
was found upon a defective indictment.' "188 Concluding that "[tihe
majority's refusal to address these issues [was) inexplicable," ' 8 9 the
dissent argued that the double jeopardy protection under the four-
teenth amendment should be the same as under the fifth amendment
and that federal cases made clear the substance of the fifth amendment
guarantee. A traditional incorporation approach to the fourteenth
amendment would have had it so. Instead, because of the dismissal of
the writ of certiorari, the guilty verdict in the second trial stood, thus
establishing a different double jeopardy standard in the state courts.
Another proposition concerning double jeopardy that separated the
three remaining traditional incorporationists from the rest of the
Burger Court involved the so-called "single transaction" principle.
Since Ashe v. Swenson, 190 Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall
have maintained that after Benton incorporated the fifth amendment
protection against double jeopardy, prosecutions must "join at one trial
all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal
act, occurrence, episode, or transaction."' 91 Although the Court in
Harris v. Washington 192 made clear that "collateral estoppel in crimi-
nal trials is an integral part of the protection against double jeopardy
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, ' 93 in Robinson
183. Id. at 127.
184. Id. Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall.
185. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
186. 405 U.S. at 130-31, quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957).
187. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
188. 405 U.S. at 131, quoting Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 130 (1904) (emphasis
added by Justice Brennan).
189. 405 U.S. at 133.
190. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
191. Id. at 453-54 (Brennan, J., concurring).
192. 404 U.S. 55 (1971).
193. Id. at 56. Collateral estoppel "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once
been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the
same parties in any future lawsuit." 397 U.S. at 443.
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v. Neil, 194 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, implied that the
"dual sovereignties" concept enunciated in Bartkus v. Illinois 195 was
not precluded by collateral estoppel. 19 6 Thus, under Bartkus, where a
single criminal act violates both state and federal law, each sovereignty
may constitutionally prosecute once. It is these multiple prosecutions
arising out of a single transaction that have caused concern to Justices
Brennan, Douglas and Marshall; they would use the single transaction
test to give a greater restrictive effect to the constitutional prohibitions
against double jeopardy. 197
C. Neo-Incorporation and the Right of Confrontation
Schneble v. Florida1 9 8 is another Burger Court decision which
reflects the dual standard concerning procedural rights characteristic of
neo-incorporation. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist held that
the admission of a confession of guilt by a codefendant is harmless
error in a state criminal case when there is independent evidence to
support a jury verdict. 19 9 Schneble originally had been remanded by
the Warren Court2° ° to the Florida Supreme Court for further consid-
eration in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Bruton v. United States.20 ' Bruton in effect held that
despite instructions to the jury to disregard the implicating statements in determining the
codefendant's guilt or innocence, admission at a joint trial of a defendant's extrajudicial
confession implicating a codefendant violated the codefendant's right of cross-
examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 20 2
Roberts v. Russell20 3 held that Bruton must be applied to the states
because Pointer v. Texas20 4 had incorporated the sixth amendment's
right of confrontation. 2 5
In his dissenting opinion in Schneble, Justice Marshall, speaking for
194. 409 U.S. 505 (1973).
195. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
196. 409 U.S. at 510.
197. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring); see Wells v. Missouri, 419 U.S. 1075 (1974) (mom.)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 57 (1971) (per curiam) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justices
Douglas and Marshall joined Justice Brennan in each of these opinions.
198. 405 U.S. 427 (1972).
199. Id. at 431-32. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Stewart, Blackmun and Powell.
200. Schneble v. Florida, 392 U.S. 298 (1968).
201. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
202. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968) (per curiam).
203. Id.
204. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
205. 392 U.S. at 294.
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the three traditional incorporationists, 20 6 disagreed with the majority's
finding that there was independent evidence to support the jury
verdict; therefore, the admission of the confession, in violation of
Bruton, was not harmless error.20 7 Justice Marshall speculated that
perhaps the majority intended "to emasculate Bruton."208 That indeed
may have been their purpose, but the neo-incorporation majority on
the Burger Court could--consistent with its view of the fourteenth
amendment-preserve Bruton under the sixth amendment while
applying a "watered-down" version of the right of confrontation in
state cases such as Schneble.20 9
D. Neo-Incorporation and the State's Burden of Proof
In 1970, the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment
guarantee of due process requires that an accused shall not be con-
victed "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 2'10 This
holding notwithstanding, in Cupp v. Naughten,211 the Burger Court,
through Justice Rehnquist, further pursued the double standard in
criminal procedures which characterizes neo-incorporation.
Cupp raised the question whether a charge to a jury in a state
criminal case that "[e]very witness is presumed to speak the truth1212
unconstitutionally "shifted the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt and forced [the defendant] instead to prove his
innocence. ' 213 The trial judge had also charged the jury that the
206. Justices Marshall, Douglas and Brennan.
207. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 437 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208. Id.
209. A more recent case which raised the issue of a double standard for the right to
confrontation is Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). Certiorari was issued to review
a conviction reversal by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit based upon
improper remarks made to the jury in the prosecutor's summation in a state trial. The Court's
opinion by Justice Rehnquist held that in the context of the trial, the prosecutor's improper
remarks did not violate DeChristoforo's due process rights because the comments were charac-
terized in advance as opinion, and not as evidence. Id. at 646-47. In his dissent, Justice Douglas
argued that the prosecutor's statements constituted a violation of the incorporated right of
confrontation because the prosecutor, though not a witness, nevertheless added to the trial
record. Id. at 650-51. Arguing that this speculation by the prosecutor would not be admissible in
a federal court, Justice Douglas cited Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927). 416 U.S.
at 650. Although Justices Brennan and Marshall did not fully join in Justice Douglas' dissent,
they did join in that portion of Justice Douglas' dissent which argued that the reversal of the
conviction should have been sustained, because the judge's instruction to the jury to disregard the
prosecutor's remarks was insufficient to cure the error. Id. at 652.
210. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
211. 414 U.S. 141 (1973).
212. Id. at 142.
213. Id. at 143.
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defendant was entitled to a presumption of innocence and emphasized
that the state had a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 214
Consequently, the Court did not find the "presumption-of-
truthfulness" instruction a matter of constitutional dimension. 21 5
Taking note of the fact that nine cases from various federal courts of
appeals "had expressed disapproval of the presumption-of-truthfulness
instruction, '216 Justice Rehnquist pointed out that these reversals of
conviction all dealt with federal, not state court proceedings. 217 Justice
Rehnquist stated that these conviction reversals by the federal circuit
courts were an exercise of the "so-called supervisory power of an
appellate court to review proceedings of trial courts, '21 8 thus implying
that no federal constitutional questions were at issue in the cases. 219
The dissent by Justice Brennan, in which the other two traditional
incorporationists joined, countered that the United States Courts of
Appeals in every federal circuit have "disapproved of presumption-of-
truthfulness instructions and have often expressed their objections in
terms of constitutional values. '220 The dissenting justices rejected the
"supervisory capacity" argument and instead claimed that at issue in
these cases was the constitutional burden of proof which the due
process clause places upon the government. Constitutionally based in
due process under the fifth amendment, the burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt was equally applicable to the states under
the fourteenth amendment and was subverted by the "presumption-
of-truthfulness instruction."'2 21
VI. CONCLUSION
It may be tempting to equate neo-incorporation with a "warmed over"
ordered liberty approach to the fourteenth amendment. 222 Yet, it has
been characteristic of all the varieties of incorporationist justices,
including the neo-incorporationists, to use federal cases establishing the
substance of amendments four, five, six and eight to determine, in part,
the procedural guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. Because all
214. Id. at 148-49.
215. Id. at 149.
216. Id. at 144 n.4.
217. Id. at 146.
218. Id.
219. See Murphy v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 2031, 2038 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Hill, The
Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 181. 193-213 (1969).
220. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 151 n.2 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Moreover,"
Justice Brennan wrote, "the presumption-of-truthfulness instruction itself is constitutionally
defective." Id. at 153.
221. Id. at 154-55.
222. Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 118 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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ordered liberty justices have invariably insisted that the fourteenth
amendment has meaning and content independent of the Bill of Rights,
federal cases could not be used to define the guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment, and fourteenth amendment state cases could not be used to
determine the scope of federal procedural rights under amendments four,
five, six and eight The Burger Court majority has exhibited this
distinguishing characteristic of incorporation by using federal cases to
determine the scope and meaning of fourteenth amendment procedural
guarantees 223 and the converse.224 They have thus displayed some kind
of incorporation approach as distinct from an ordered liberty approach.
Neo-incorporation as manifested by the Burger Court in state
procedural rights cases appears to be a "half-way house" between the
substance of ordered liberty and that of traditional incorporation as
expressed in the Warren Court decisions of the 1960s. At this point in
the history of the Burger Court, it seems that the thrust for congruency
in federal and state criminal procedures-the central goal of traditional
incorporationists since 1942-is being decreased. 2 s The extent to
which the neo-incorporation approach will permit different procedures
to be used in state criminal cases is not certain after only a few years
of the Supreme Court's new procedural rights voting alignment.
Speculation about the future of the incorporation approach to due
process brings to mind a concern long expressed by former Justice
Harlan. In a number of opinions, 226 Justice Harlan predicted that, in
the long run, the incorporation approach to due process would not lead
to strengthened criminal procedures in state courts, but, instead,
would lead to a "derogation of law enforcement standards in the
federal system ... 227 For instance, in Williams v. Florida,2z the
Court held that a twelve member jury is not constitutionally required
in state criminal trials. Using the logic of traditional incorporation in
reverse, Justice Harlan, concurring, stated that the necessary conse-
quence of the Court's decision "is that 12-member juries are not
constitutionally required in federal criminal trials either. ' 22 9 Justice
223. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (Burger, C.J.); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70
(1973) (Vhite, J.); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (Rehnquist, 1.).
224. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (Powell, J.); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.).
225. It was always the assumption of the traditional incorporationists that this congruence
would be brought about by the application of the stricter federal rules of procedure in the state
courts and not the inverse. See text accompanying notes 128-29 supra.
226. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 130 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), and cases
cited therein.
227. Id., citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45-46 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
228. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
229. Id. at 118.
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Harlan pointed out that under an ordered liberty approach this
"backlash" would not be necessary. 23
The internal logic of the selective incorporation doctrine cannot be respected if the
Court is both committed to interpreting faithfully the meaning of the federal Bill of
Rights and recognizing the governmental diversity that exists in this country. The
"backlash" in Williams exposes the malaise, for there the Court dilutes a federal
guarantee in order to reconcile the logic of "incorporation," the "jot-for-jot and case-
for-case" application of the federal right to the States, with the reality of federalism. 23 1
The prospect of the Supreme Court undoing procedural safeguards
in the federal court system to satisfy the ritual of incorporation is not a
pleasant one. 232 Perhaps, the neo-incorporationist approach to the
fourteenth amendment makes the incorporation "malaise" described by
Justice Harlan less critical for the moment. By using the language of
incorporation, the Burger Court majority appears to pay deference to
stare decisis, while eroding the substance of traditional incorporation
so as not to burden the states with the stricter federal procedural
standards. At this point in time, one conclusion seems certain. The
neo-incorporationist approach to the fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess clause illustrates at least one Burger Court procedural rights
revisionist policy in conflict with the Warren Court legacy.
230. Id. at 129.
231. Id.
232. It should be noted that in several instances the Burger Court majority has defined more
narrowly the procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights as they directly apply to the federal
government. The logic of the incorporation doctrine makes these decisions applicable to the
states. The three traditional incorporationists still on the Court-Justices Douglas, Brennan and
Marshall-have unsuccessfully opposed this trend. Throughout his judicial career, Justice White has
consistently advocated a narrow interpretation of the protections afforded the individual by the Bill
of Rights. E.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 33-34, 37-38 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 497-99 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 685-89
(1962) (dissenting opinion). Justice White and the four Nixon appointees have established a trend
toward a more narrow interpretation of federal procedural rights provided for by the Bill of Rights.
See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 322 (1975) (wider judicial summary contempt power available
against witnesses who refuse to accept statutory transactional immunity as substitute for fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)
(exclusionary rule is not part of fourth amendment and does not limit grand jury's power to compel a
witness to answer questions based on evidence obtained from a prior unlawful search and seizure);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (search incident to valid arrest requires no additional
justification); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (sixth amendment right to counsel not
violated if pre-trial photographic identification of defendant is attempted in absence of defendant's
counsel); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (grand jury subpoena to give voice exemplars
not a seizure within meaning of fourth amendment or an invasion of fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination); Kastigarv. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination not violated by compulsory process to testify before a federal grand jury
subsequent to grant of limited immunity by federal government).
